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THE-COMPENSATION OF MEDICAL WITNESSES

T

HE power to compel testimony is inherent in every court, for
without it justice could constantly be thwarted. Generally all
persons may be compelled to give evidence that is relevant to the matter in controversy. If, therefore, a person who has been duly summoned as a witness at a particular trial absents himself therefrom,
without just cause, or attending, refuses to give evidence or to answer
questions when directed so to do by the court, he is liable to punishment for contempt." But there are limitations upon the general rule,
some based upon principles of legal policy and some upon statutory
enactment. In regard to some of these the law is well settled, but in
regard to others there is still considerable conflict in judicial opinion.
The question, for example, of whether or not the physician is bound, in
obedience to process and for the compensation provided by law for
ordinary witnesses, to attend at a trial and give evidence, is one upon
which, in some of its phases, the courts that have reviewed the matter
are not in entire harmony. All agree that the physician, like the ordinary witness, is bound to obey the command of a subpoena to the extent of reporting in court, and further that he must give evidence as to
competent facts connected with the controversy that are within his
own knowledge. As to such facts he testifies as an ordinary witness.
But when he is summoned for the purpose of securing his opinion as
an expert upon a given state of facts, as an aid to the court and jury,
may he properly refuse to furnish that opinion in the absence of a provision for adequate professional compensation? Different answers to
this question have been made by different courts. In some cases the
question has assumed this form: Can the medical expert be compelled, for the ordinary witness fees, to attend a trial, listen to the
evidence adduced therein, and give his opinion in answer to hypothetI Best on Evidence (9th Ed.). § i25.
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ical questions? And in others this: Can testimony as to scientific
results, obtained by special preparation and experiment, be compelled? As will be seen, there is comparative unanimity in judicial
opinion as to the proper course where the question arises under
either of the last two forms.
The opinion has been freely expressed by text writers, and to a
limited extent has been held by courts, that the expert witness, the
medical witness, for example, who is brought into the case solely for
the professional aid that he will give to court and jury, is entitled to
professional compensation for his opinion upon assumed facts, and
that he will not be held guilty of contempt for refusing to give such
opinion unless such compensation is provided. It is the claim of
those holding this view that the knowledge of the professional man
is his property, and that he cannot be compelled to contribute it, even
for the public good, without adequate compensation; that when the
physician, for example, is asked to give an opinion in court upon
assumed facts, he is called upon to act in a professional capacity, just
as much as he is when summoned by a patient to diagnose a case; that
the public duty which rests upon every citizen to appear and give
testimony in judicial proceedings, when properly subpoenaed, is fully
met by the expert witness when he appears and announces his readiness to give his professional opinion, if adequately paid. When the
physician is once put upon the stand as a skilled witness, says Professor Ordronaux in his work upon The Jurisprudence of Medicine,
"his obligation to the public ceases, and- he stands in the position of
any professional man consulted in relation to a subject upon which
his opinion is sought. It is evident that the skill and professional
experience of a man are so far his individual capital and property that
he cannot be compelled to bestow them gratuitously upon any party.
* * * * On the witness stand, precisely as in his office, his (the
physician's) opinion may be given or witliheld at pleasure, for a
skilled witness cannot be compelled to give an opinion or committed
for contempt if he refuses to do so." 2

The leading American case in which this doctrine is endorsed, is
probably that of Buchnman v. State, which arose in- Indiana in 1877. 3
In this case a practicing physician who had been subpoenaed to give
evidence as an expert in behalf of the defendant in a criminal proceeding, was committed as for contempt by the trial court because of
his refusal to give a professional opinion upon the witness stand
without being compensated therefor. The majority of the reviewing
court l eld that, although a physician may, be required to attend as a
2Ordronaux's jurisprudence of Medicine, §§ 114, 'I5.
3Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. x, 26 Am. Rep. 75.
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witness and testify to facts within his own knowledge for the compensation provided by law for the ordinary witness, he cannot be
compelled to testify as to his professional opinion for such compensation, and that his refusal to give expert testimony unless adequately
compensated therefor is not a contempt. "It would seem, on general
principles," said the court, "that the knowledge and learning of a
physician should be regarded as his property, which ought not to be
extorted from him, in the form of opinions, without just compensation." It is suggested in this opinion that "if physicians or surgeons
can be compelled to render professional services, by giving their
opinions on the trial of criminal causes, without compensation, then
an eminent physician or surgeon may be compelled to go to any part
of the state at any and all times, to render such service, without
other compensation than such as he may recover as ordinary witness
fees." It should be noted that the decision in this case was prompted
to some extent by a provision in the state constitution to the effect
that "particular services" shall not be demanded without just compensation. It had theretofore been held by the Supreme Court of the
state that an attorney was under no obligation to perform gratuitous
service, under the appointment of a court, in the way of defending
a pauper arrested upon a criminal charge, the holding being based
upon this clause of the constitution.4 In Buchinan v. State, the court
argued that if the services of a lawyer in defending a criminal
under an appointment by the court are to be regarded as "particular
services" and hence as services for which a just compensation must
be provided, then the services of the physician who is summoned to
aid the court and jury by furnishing an expert opinion must be
regarded as "particular." "Is not his medical knowledge," said the
court, "his capital stock? Are his professional services more at the
mercy of the public than the services of a lawyer? When a physician
testifies as an expert, by giving his opinion he is performing a strictly
professional service. * * * * The purpose of his service is not
to prove facts in the cause, but to aid the court or jury in arriving
at a proper conclusion from facts otherwise proved. Is not this
also the province and business of an attorney? Are not the services of
each equally 'particular?'" But the opinion of the court in Buchman
v. State did not stand unchallenged. A vigorous dissent by BMDLE,
C. J., in which NIBLACK, J., concurred, was filed in the subsequent
case of Dills v. State.* The rule in Indiana upon this subject, doubt" Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 5z5; Webb. v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.
5 Dills v. State, s9 Ind. is.
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less as a result of the decision in Buchman v. State, has since been
changed by statute. 6
Two cases arising in United States courts apparently recognize the
rule as promulgated in Buchman v. State. Upon motion of the district attorney In the Matter of Roelkere for a capias to bring in a
witness who had been subpoenaed to act as an interpreter, JUDGE
SPRAGu

in denying the motion said that a similar question had

theretofore arisen as to experts, and that he had declined in such
cases to issue process to arrest. "When," continued the court, "a person has knowledge of any fact pertinent to an issue to be tried, he
may be compelled to attend as a witness. In this all stand upon equal
ground. But to compel a person to attend merely because he is
accomplished in a particular science, art or profession, would subject
the same individual to be called upon in every case in which any
question in his department of knowledge is to be solved. Thus, the
most eminent physician might be compelled, merely for the ordinary
witness fees, to attend from the remotest part of the district and give
his opinion in every trial in which a medical question should arise.
This is so unreasonable that nothing but necessity can justify it." In
United States v. Howe,8 JUDGE PARKER declined to regard the refusal
of a physician to testify as an expert unless paid a reasonable compensation in advance as a contempt of court, holding "that there was
a wide distinction between a witness called to depose to a matter of
opinion depending on his skill in a particular profession or trade and
a witness who is called to depose to facts which he saw."
The foregoing, so far as the writer has observed, are the only
opinions by American courts that support the proposition that the
medical expert may demand, as a matter of right, the payment 6f
professional fees as a condition precedent to his giving an opinion in
court based upon an assumed state of facts. But it should be noted
that expressions have been used by some of the English courts that
would seem tojustify the practice. For example, MAULE, J., in Webb
v. Page9 said: "There is a distinction betNireen the case of a man who
sees a fact and is called to prove it in a court of justice and that of a
man who is selected by a party to give his opinion on a matter with
0 It is now provided by statute in that state that "a witness who is an expert in any art,
science, trade, profession or mystery may be compelled to appear and testify to an opinion,
as such expert, in relation to any matter, whenever such opinion is material evidence, relevant to an issue on trial before a court, without payment or tender of compensation other
than the per diem and mileage allowed by law to witnesses, under the same rules and regulations by which he can be compelled to appear and testify to his knowledge of facts relevant
to the same issue." Burns' Indiana Statutes (19o), Vol. I, § Si2.
'In the Matter of Roelker, Sprague, 276.
United States v. Howe, U. S. Dist. Ct. W. D. Ark., 12 Cent. L. J. 193.
'ebb v. Page, i C. & K. 23.
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which he is peculiarly conversant from the nature of his employment
in life. The former is bound as a matter of public duty to speak to a
fact which happens to have fallen within his knowledge; without
such testimony the course of justice must be stopped. The latter is
under no such obligation." In Clark v. Gill, WOOD,V. C., said "that
he had been informed by a very eminent common law authority that
professional men were very clearly entitled to receive compensation
for their time before they were sworn, and that they might refuse to
give their evidence until payment had been made."' 10 While not
bearing directly upon the phase of the question under discussion, it
may be noted that in some of the English courts the doctrine has been
recognized that the medical witness is entitled to extra compensation
on account of loss of time. In Severn v. Olive,1 the question being
as to whether the expense of experiments made for the purpose of
getting evidence upon a point in dispute that was new to scientific
men, could be allowed upon the taxation of costs, the court held that
"no allowance ought to-be made for the expense of experiments, nor
for the time of scientific witnesses unless they were medical men,
such as physicians and surgeons." In this case, as given in Moore's
Reports,12 LORD CHIEF JusTIcE DALLAS said: "It does not appear
to me that the expenses incurred in making experiments ought to be
allowed; nor ought there to be any compensation to those scientific
witnesses who were employed in making them, quasi loss of time, as
such allowance appears to be confined to medical men and attorneys
only." MR. JUSTICE RICHARDSON said in this case that it was quite
clear that pers6ns in the legal and medical professions only were
entitled to an allowance for loss of time during their attendance as
witnesses. While these statements, so far as they refer to physicians,
are perhaps in the nature of dicta, they indicate the attitude of these
courts in regard to compensation to physicians while serving as
expert witnesses. But there are dicta by English judges that point
in a different direction. For example, in Lonergan v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 3 TiL-DAL, C. J., said that "the general rule has
been that where a witness attends under a subpoena, none receive any
allowance for loss of time except medical men and attorneys." But
he added, "If that rule were to undergo revision, I cannot say it
would stand the test of examination. There is no reason for assuming that the time of medical men and attorneys is more valuable than
that of others whose livelihood depends on theit own exertions."
"0Clark v. Gill, 2 week. Rep. 652, 1 Kay & Johns. 19, 23 L. J. Rep. (N. S. Equity) 7!!.
"tSevern v. Olive, 3 Brod. & Bing. 72.
"2Severn v. Olive. 6 J. B.. Moore, 235.
23Lonergan v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 7 Bing. 725, 731.
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And in the same case PARK, J., said: "In Moore v. Adam, it was
stated that upon process in this country, allowance for time is only
made to medical men and attorneys; a rule which appears to be hard
and partial; for time to a poor man is of as much importance as to
an attorney." GASpLZE, J., also referred to the rule as a harsh one. It
has been suggested that the English decisions upon the subject have
probably been influenced by the statute of 5 Eliz. Ch. 9, which enacts
that the witness must "have tendered to him according to his countenance, or calling, his reasonable charges.""' And it may be added
that, under the English practice of the present day, the scales of
allowances to w-itnesses recognize and provide for different allowances to witnesses in different classes.-I
The weight of authority in the United States at the present time
is undoubtedly in favor of the proposition that the expert medical
witness is not entitled to compensation in addition to that provided
by law for the ordinary witness, when he is called upon in court
simply for his opinion as an expert upon assumed facts, and that a
refusal to answer unless compensated upon a professional basis will
render him guilty of contempt. The reasoning upon which this conclusion is based, is summarized in the following paragraphs.
It is the general policy of the law that all persons who enjoy the
protection to person and property that our institutions afford, should
render in return therefor, without regard to social position or business or professional rank, such public duties as the law imposes. It
is necessary to the orderly and effective administration of justice in
our courts that every citizen when summoned to public duties therein
should make such personal sacrifices as the proper performance of
such duties requires. But while these principles have genierally been
recognized, it has been claimed, as hereinbefore shown, that they
cannot properly be enforced to the extent of compelling the expert
medical witness to give to a court and jury his opinion as an expert
without professional compensation, as such a course would be the
taking from him of his property without adequate compensation,
which the law will not sanction. The answer to this argument, which
finds ample support in the authorities, is that knowledge of itself is
not, strictly speaking, property. The expert speaks from the abundance of his knowledge that he has acquired by study, experiment,
experience or in any other way; the ordinary witness speaks from his
knowledge that he has acquired by being present at the time of the
transaction that is the subject-mhtter of inquiry or through some of
the ordinary avenues of information. The opinion of the former
:4 See Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 391.
' See Vols.
and 2, Yearly County Court Practice for i9o5, pp. 779, 780.
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becomes a fact in the case for the consideration of the jury just as the
facts testified to by the latter are for their consideration. The knowledge of the expert is not property that is taken from him when he is
compelled by the court to give his opinion any more than the knowledge as to the facts of the ordinary witness is property that is taken
from him when he is compelled to testify to. the facts. Abstract
knowledge is not property, but the right to use knowledge, or the use
of knowledge for the accomplishment of a particular result, may be
property. The right to practice medicine, for example, is a property
right, and the application of medical knowledge for the relief of a
patient would be the exercise of a property right. But the medical
expert when called upon to aid court and jury by his opinion simply,
he not having been required to reach his conclusion by special study,
preparation or experiment, is not asked to excercise a property right.
To require the medical expert to testify to his opinion simply, is no
more the taking of his property than it would be to require him to
testify to the facts if he happened to know them.
These views are directly supported in Dixon v. People,18 in which
the court uses the following language: "It is not exactly accurate to
say that the mere abstract knowledge, acquired in the study of a
special employment, is of itself property. It is the right to apply that
knowledge to the accomplishment of a particular result which constitutes property. For instance, if the appellant had been required to
answer a question put to him with a view of prescribing a remedy for
the relief of * * * the plaintiff in the suit in which he was called
to testify as a witness, then it might be said, if he was not offered any
compensation, that he was deprived of a property right. But where a
physician is asked a hypothetical question, and is called upon to give
his opinion upon the facts stated in the hypothetical question, while
he is testifying as a witness in court, he is not thereby required to
practice his healing art. He is merely making a statement, not for
the purpose of effecting a cure, or relieving a patient, but for the
purpose of enabling the court and the jury to understand correctly
a case which is before the court. There is no infringement here of a
property right." The court also says that when a physician is required to answer a hypothetical question which involves a special
knowledge peculiar to his calling, he is merely required to do what
every good citizen is required to do in behalf of public peace and
public order and in promotion of the public good. "It is the duty of
the ordinary witness and of the expert witness to testify as to facts
within their knowledge which bear upon the decision of controversies
in court. Such duty devolves upon each as a citizen and [also] in
Dixon v. People, x68 II. 179.
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view of the protection which he receives from the laws of the country in the matter of his personal liberty and in the matter of the
protection of his property. This duty devolves as much upon a physician who is required to testify as an expert witness in answer to,
hypothetical questions as it does upon the ordinary witness testifying
to facts within his knowledge." These views also find support *in
the cases cited belowY
The argument that the expert medical witness is entitled to extra
compensation on account of loss of time, is answered by the suggestion that such a loss is a sacrifice that every witness must make as
an aid to the due administration of justice. The hardship in his case
is no greater relatively than in the case of the man in some other
calling. The pecuniary sacrifice, if measured, as in justice it should
be, by the protection received from an orderly and intelligent administration of the laws, should be greater in the case of the man who
has much to protect than in the case of the one who has little. Men
of large interests need large public protection, and their contribution
to the upholding of that system of laws by which their rights are
guarded, shotfld be correspondingly great. Furthermore, the interruption to regular business ordinarily is relatively no more serious in
the case of the professional man who is summoned as an expert than
it is in the case of the man who is called from the more humble walks
of life. The former returns to waiting patients or clients who in
place of his services have received the attention of able partners or
assistants; the latter returns to his work perhaps to find his opportunity gone by reason of his enforced absence. It may be said, moreover, in this connection, that if the physician is entitled to professional compensation when called as an expert, because of loss of
time, he should be entitled to the same compensation when called
upon to testify to facts as an ordinary witness. There is loss of time
in the'one case as well as in the other, and yet it would not be
claimed that as an ordinary witness he would be entitled to professional fees. It may' be suggested further that in the absence of
explicit statutory provisions upon the subject, there w6uld be great
practical difficulty in determining as to the amount of compensation
" Exv parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, a5 Am. Rep. 611; Co. Commissioners v. Lee, 3 CoL
App. 177; Summers v. State, 5 Texas App. 365, 32-Am. Rep. 573. In this case it was held
that a physician who had made a post-mortem examination could be compelled to testify
concerning its results and his opinions derived therefrom in the absence of a provision for

professional compensation. Upon the trial the witness had declined to state the cause of
death on the ground that his knowledge was obtained by professional skill and from the
deductions of experience which he considered his own property. The reviewing court said
in this case that "a medical expert could not be compelled to make a post-mortem examination unless paid for it; but an examination having already been made by him, he could be

compelled to disclose the result of that examination."
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to be allowed and in discriminating in the matter of compensation
between different kinds of experts.
The above reasoning is fully supported by authority. "Loss of
time," tays the court in Dixon v. People"" "as a ground for claiming
extra compensation for services as a witness applies as well to all
ordinary witnesses as to expert witnesses. It is conceded that when
any witness, whether he is an expert witness or not, is acquainted with
any facts which bear upon the matter in controversy in a litigation, he
is obliged to testify; and a distinction is drawn between the testimony
of an expert witness who is acquainted with the facts about which
he testifies and an-expert witness who is called upon to give his
opinion in reply to a hypothetical question without any knowledge of
facts. Manifestly the witness who goes to court and testifies as to
.the facts of which he knows, is subjected to a loss of his time as
much as a witness who goes there to testify as an expert upon a mere
matter of opinion." "The professional witness," says the court, in
County Commissioners v. Lee,19 "in the discharge of his'duty as a
good citizen is like any other person, whether he be laborer, ierchant,
broker, manufacturer or banker, compellable to attend in obedience
to process and to testify as to what he may know, whether it be
observed facts or accumulated knowledge acquired by study and
experience. The rule is a sound one and commends itself to our
judgment. It is apparently nothing but a question of relative value,
and it frequently happens that the loss of time is a less serious one
to the professional witness than to the person engaged in the more
active walks of life." An important case upon this phase of the subject is that of Ex parte Dement, to which reference has already been
made. In the course of the opinion the court uses the following
language, which is significant in this connection: "The same principle which justifies the bringing of the mechanic from his workshop, the merchant from his storehouses, the broker from 'change,
or the lawyer from his engagements, to testify in regard to some
matter which he has learned in the exercise of his art or profession,
authorizes the summoning of a physician, or surgeon, or skilled
apothecary, to testify of a like matter, when relevant to a cause pending for determination in a judicial tribunal. And if in a prosecution
of an individual for murder, it was proved that his supposed victim
had, a short time before his death, drunk something which he had
received from the accused, and a chemist had analyzed the liquid and
testified what substances it contained, and a physician was summoned
IsDixon v. People, x68 Ill. 179, 189. See, also, North Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Zeiger,
18 Il. 9.
0 County Commissioners v. Lee, 3 Col. App. 177, 8o.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

to prove what effect they would have when taken into the stomach of
a living man and what would be the symptoms of such effect, no
court would be excusable in exonerating the physician from giving
such evidence solely on the ground that it would be a professional
opinion for which he had not been paid, or received a promise of
payment. In so testifying he would not be practicing the healing art;
be would, like the merchant, or the lawyer, or the mechanic, before
referred to, be deposing only to things which he had learned in the
course of his occupation or profession, or of the preparation for it,
and the disclosure of which to the court would conduce to a correct
understanding of a cause before it. His testimony would concern
the administration of justice. And of him, as of other witnesses, it
could be justly 'claimed by the public, as a tax paid by him to that
system of laws which protects his rights as well as others.' The
decisions of courts concern the property, reputation, liberty or lives
of men, and are carried into execution as the judgments of the law.
Every individual, high or low, is subject to them. It is, therefore,
of vital public interest that the tribunals which pronounce these judgments shall have power to coerce the production of any relevant evidence existing within the sphere of their jurisdiction, requisite to
prevent them from falling into error.""0 In Main v. Sherman County,
recently decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska (see note 20),
the court suggests that the rule putting the medical expert upon a
plane with other witnesses, when he testifies to an opinion simply, is
not so oppressive as it might appear at first glance, and continues:
"The benefits of civil government of necessity carry with them certain duties more or less onerous to the citizen. It not infrequently
happens that the citizen is compelled to serve the state at a pecuniary
loss. When an officer armed with a warrant commands the assistance
of a citizen in making an arrest, the latter, however valuable his
time, is not permitted to stand and bicker for fees; when called to
' Ex porte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 396, 397, 25 Am. Rep. 61x. See, also, Minn. v. Teipner, 36 Minn. 535, 32 N. W. Rep. 678; Finn v. Prairie County, 6o Ark. 204, 29 S. W. Rep.
459, 27 L. R. A. 669, 46 Am. St. Rep. 168; County Com'rs v. Lee, 3 Colo. App. r77, 32 Pac.
Rep. 841; Summers v. State, s Tex. App. 365, 32 Am. Rep. 573; Main v. Sherman Co.
(Neb. Sup. Court, June 8, 19o5), 103 N. W. Rep. 5038.
If a professional witness desires to raise the question as to the payment of professional
compensation as a condition precedent to his giving expert testimony, he should do so at
once and before he has testified at all as to professional matters. In Wright v. People,
112 Ill. 540, a physician had testified as to the condition of a patient and was then asked
if a blow described in the question would or would not be likely to produce upon the person receiving it a condition like or similar to that in which he found the patient. On
error it was held that his refusal to answer unless he was first paid or had secured to him
his professional fee was improper because he had without objection stated the condition
of the patient, and for that reason he "could not, under any rule of law, refuse to state
what would cause the symptoms he discovered to exist."
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serve as a juror, a citizen will not be heard to complain that the compensation fixed by law is inadequate. As to compensation in such
matters, the scale is fixed without regard to calling or countenance,
and the common laborer and the man of large affairs, rich and poor,
learned and unlearned are on equal footing."
But a different question arises when the medical expert is called
upon to make special preparation for his examination as a witness,
such, for example, as a chemical analysis, or scientific tests, or a postmortem examination. There is also a different question when the
expert is required to attend the trial day after day and thereby prepare himself for giving his opinion. Where special preparation' is
demanded, the medical expert in making it is acting in a professional
capacity, and for such services is entitled to professional compensation. And he cannot be compelled to make such preparation unless a
reasonable compensation for his time and2 services is forthcoming.
As to this doctrine there is no controversy. '
Where special services by the expert or special investigations by
him are necessary in order that he may be prepared to testify, the
proper public official, even in the absence of a statute upon the subject, may undoubtedly bind the county therefor, if the case be a
public one; and in a civil case the matter may be the subject of a
private arrangement, provided it be free from improper conditions
and influences. 22
The question of the fees of a medical expert for special services
in preparation for his testimony at a coroner's inquest naturally falls
under this head, and may properly be discussed in this connection.
And first it should be suggested that this matter is one that has been
very generally provided for by statutory enactment. Many of the
provisions upon the subject are collected in the note.23 From an exam.1 See Ex parte Dement, S3 Ala. 389, 397, -S Am. Rep. 61 ; Finn v. Prairie County, 60
Ark. 204, 29 S. W. Rep. 459, 27 L. R. A. 669, 46 Am. St. Rep. x68; People v. Montgomery,
x3 Abb. Pr. N. S. 207; Summers v. State, s Tex. App. 374, 32 Am. Rep. 573; St. Francis
Co. v. Cummings, 5S Ark. 419.
2 Barrus v. Phaneuf, 166 Mass. 123, 44 N. E. Rep. 141; Brown t. 1 ravelers Life and
Accident Ins. Co., 26 App. Div. Rep. (N. Y.), 544. But an agreement would be void as
against public policy that should provide that a physician who is bound to give his best
judgment upon a question and who does not hold himself out as the agent of one of the
parties, should be paid for his services in proportion to the amount recovered. Thomas
v. Caulkett, 57 Mich. 392.
23 Although the statute in Arkansas does not expressly authorize the coroner to summon

a physician and order an autopsy, it has been held that if such a course is necessary in
order to ascertain the truth in regard to the death of a person, he may properly do so, and
that the county is liable for a reasonable compensation for the services. St. Francis Co.
v. Cummings, 55 Ark. 419, 18 S. V. Rep. 461. In Connecticut the physician called by
the coroner is entitled to the sum of five dollars for an external examination only and
to the sum of twenty-five dollars for an autopsy. General Statutes of Conn. (1902),
§ 4853. In Ca'lfornia "coroners * * * * may summon a surgeon or physician to inspect
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ination of these it will be apparent that in most jurisdictions the
physician or surgeon when summoned to appear before the coroner,
is entitled to fees other than those provided for ordinary witnesses,
but that, in order to be entitled to such fees, he must be summoned
to give his opinion as a medical man for the guidance of the jury,
and usually to give his opinion after preparing himself so to do
either by an inspection of the body of the deceased or by a postuiorten. examination. If called upon, like the ordinary witness, to
testify to facts simply, he would not be entitled to extra compensation. The theory upon which this legislation is based is, ordinarily,
that special services are necessary m order that the physician may
be prepared to give an opinion as to the manner and cause of death
that may be of aid to the jury, and that it is only just that compensation should be provided for .such services. But in the absence
of a statute expressly providing for special compensation to the
physician summoned by the coroner, and who -underthe order of the
coroner has performed services that he may be prepared to testify
intelligently, the physician would undoubtedly have a claim against
the body or hold a post-mortem examination thereon," but there is no direct provision as
In Colorado it is provided that
Penal Code of Cal. (19o), § 1512.
to compensation.
"in the * * * * inquisition by a coroner, where a jury shall deem it requisite, he may
summon one or more physicians or surgeons to make scientific examination, and he may
allow in such a case a reasonable compensation, subject to the confirmation of the board
Mills' Stat. of Col. (189), 884. It has been held that it is
of county commissioners."
the duty of the physician or surgeon so summoned to obey the summons, and that he cannot be required, as a prerequisite to his receiving compensation, to show that the jury
toolk action under the section. He need not make an investigation as to the action of the
jury, as he has a right to rely upon the official act of the coroner. Com'rs of Pueblo Co.
v. Marshall, si CoL 84. In Florida the physician's fee for attending a coroner's inquest
and making a post-mortein examination is ten dollars, to be paid by the state. Rev. Statute.
of Fla. (1892), p. 912. In Georgia "if the coroner and the majority of the jury shall
believe that the ends of justice can only be attained by a thorough post-mortem examination, the coroner may employ a competent and impartial physician to make such examination, and the physician so employed shall be paid out of the county treasury such sum, not
exceeding twenty dollars, as may be agreed to by the coroner and jury." Georgia Code,
Vol. 3, (1S95), § 1266. In counties having a population of 40,000 or more, a physician
to the coroner with a fixed salary is appointed, § 1267. In Idaho "coroners * * * * may
summon a surgeon or physician to inspect the body and give a professional opinion as to
the cause of the death." Idaho Penal Code (19o). 5775. Although no provision for
c,mpensation is made in this statute, it has been held that a reasonable charge for such
services is a proper claim against the county, to be allowed by the county commissioners.
And although the statute does not expressly provide for an autopsy, the physician summoned may make one, if it is necessary in order to enable him to form a professional
opinion as to the cause of death, and the reasonable value of his services therefor is a
legitimate claim against the county. Fairchild v. Ada County, 6 Idaho 340, 55 Pac. Rep.
654. The statutory provision in Washington is similar to that in Idaho, and doubtless
would be construed in the same way. Ballingers' Ann. Codes and Statutes of Wash., Vol.
1, § 529. In Indiana, it is provided that when a surgeon or physician is required to attend
an inquest and make a post.mortem examination, "the coroner shall certify such service
to the board of county commissioners, who shall order the same paid out of the county
treasury." Burns' Statutes of Indiana (19ox), Vol. 3, 7955. The following statutes pro-
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the county for reasonable compensation for such services, though he
would not, in most jurisdictions, have a claim for extra compensation as a witness simply. In other words, the physician summoned
by the coroner simply to testify at an inquest would only be entitled
to ordinary witness fees, in the absence of a statute providing for
extra fees, unless under the holding of the courts where the case
arises, he would be entitled to extra compensation on the ground of
his being an expert, but for special work done for the inquest, under
the regular order of the proper authority, he would be entitled to
reasonable compensation, even in the absence of a statutory provision upon the subject, and the county, which ordinarily is responsible
for the administration of the criminal law within -its bor'ders, would
be liable therefor. The reason is not far to seek. It is the duty of
the coroner, recognized and enforced by the common law,- to ascertain the truth, if possible, in regard to the case under investigation,
vidc for a reasonable compensation to lihysiCans and surgeons who may be summoned by
coroners, to be allowed by a designated agency, in some cases a limit being placed upon
the amount that can be allowed, while itrother cases there is no limit: Code of Iowa
(1897), § 529, (It has been held that a physician is not bound to accept the amount
allowed him for his services, by the designated agency, but that if the amount allowed is
not reasonable, he may recover a reasonable compensation for his services from the county.
.loser -. Boon Co., 91 Iowa, 359); General Statutes of Kansas (igo), § x775; Th6
Kentucky Statutes (Carroll) (1899), p. 326; Rev. Laws of Louisiana (Wolff) (1897),
§ 66o; Rev. Statutes of Maine (1903), p. 984, § 1a; Poe's Pub. Gen. Laws of Maryland
(1904), p. 53t; Rev. Codes of So. Dak. (1903), p. 162, § 913; Rev. Stat. of Utah (x898),
§ 1230; Va. Code (1904), VoL 2, § 3947;. Code of V. Va. (x899), ioo6, § 9; Gen. Stat.
of N. J. (1709-1895), Vol. s, p. 9oo, § 15; Rev. Codes of N. Dak..(s8gg), § 2022; New
Hampshire Laws 1903, Ch. 134, § 13. In Missouri, Mississippi and Vermont a sum not
exceeding ten dollars may be allowed. Missouri Rev. Stat. (s899), § 6652; Miss. Code
88
(1892), § 824; Vermont Statutes (1894), § 53 . Six dollars per day and ten cents per
mile for traveling are allowed in Minnesota, but it is provided that if it is made to .appear
that the "'post.nortem examination was attended by great and unusual difficulties," such
further sum as in the opinion of the board of county commissioners is a just and fair
compensation for the services rendered may be allowed. Minn. General Laws (gos), p.
279. A somewhat similar provision is found in Pennsylvania and North Carolina. Pepper
& Lewis' Digest, Vol. i, p. 928; N. C. Revisal of 1905, § 2775. In Rhode Island, the compensation is fixed at five dollars and in Oklahoma at five dollars per day and five cents per
mile for traveling. General Laws of R. I. (1896), p. 1028, § 9; Rev. & Ann. Statutes of
Okla. (1903), Vol. 1, p. 436, § iig. It is provided in Tennessee that the fee of the physician summoned by the coroner shall not exceed that of the coroner, and that it shall be
allowed in the hill of costs. Code of Tenn. (1896), § 7281. In Michigan provision is
made for securing "the attendance at an inquest of a competent physician or surgeon for,
the purpose of making a post-inortem examination, and of testifying as to the result of the
same, the compensation to be audited and allowed -by the board of supervisors of the
proper county. 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1897) (1182). In Massachusestts "if a medical
examiner.* * * ' considers it necessary to have a physician present as a witness at an
autopsy, he shall be paid $s for his services." Mass. Rev. Laws. 1902, Vol. 1, p. 361,
§ 9, 1. s5. In Wyoming, it is provided that "any physician or surgeon who may be called
upon to testify as an expert before a coroner, or other officer, shall be entitled to a fee
of $5 for half a day or less and for more than half a day $So, and when called upon to
make a post-iortcui examination, shall be entitled to a fee of $30; provided, that the post.
iuortem be actually made." Rev. Stat. of Wyo. (1899), § 4299.
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and if, in the course of the inquiry, it becomes necessary, in his
judgment, to employ a physician to make an autopsy as an aid in
ascertaining the cause of death, he would be justified in making the
order. By the imposition of the duty upon him, the coroner, as is
said in St. Francis County v. Cummings, cited below, "is authorized
to do all things whatsoever reasonably necessary to discharge that
duty." In considering this subject, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in County of Northampton v. Innes, cited below, says: "In
this enlightened age, a coroner who would consign to the grave the
body over which he had held an inquest, without availing himself of
the lights which the medical science has placed within his reach,
would, in most cases, fall short of what his official duty requires. A
thorough examination, aided by professional skill, is in general absolutely necessary to the proper administration of justice. * * * 4
There can be no doubt of the duty of the coroner to require such aid
as was given in this case; and it seems equally clear that his powers
are commensurate with his duties. He is the officer 2of4 the law, and
his contract in this respe& is binding on the county."
But it has been held that where the fee for the services of a physician in connection with an inquest has been fixed by statute, that
compensation must govern.", The common law power of the coroner to bind the county for the services of a physician in making a
post-mortet in connection with an inquest has been denied in Texas.
"A post-mortem examination, at a coroner's inquest," says the
Supreme Court of that state, "is frequently necessary for the detection and punishment of crime. It does not seem just to impose this
duty without compensation upon a learned and enlightened profession, whose custom it is not to refuse the calls of charity. But they
must look to the legislature for--relief. We can. only declare the
law as we find it; and as it now stands, we think there is no provision
2 6for their compensation.
If the physician summoned by the coroner is at the time employed
by the county to treat the poor of the county asylum, this fact would
2. St. Francis County v. Cummings, ss'Ark. 419, x8 S. W. Rep. 461; Allegheny County
v. WVatts, 3 Penn. St. 462; County of Northampton v. Innes, 26 Penn. St. 156; County of
Allegheny v. Shaw, 34 Pa. St. 3oi; Commissioners of Pueblo County v. Marshall, ri Col.
84, 16 Pac. Rep. 837; Gaston v. Marion County, 3 Ind. 497; Greene z. Monroe County, 72
Miss. 306. This matter is now regulated by statute in Indiana, but the discussions in the
following cases throw light upon the subject: Stevens -r. Board of Commissioners of Harrison County, 46 Ind. 541; Jameson z. Board of Commissioners of Bartholomew County,
64 Ind. 524; Dearborn County '. Bond, 88 Ind. 1o2; Dubois County z-. \Vertz, 112 Ind.
268, r3 N. E. Rep. 874.
21 Greene v. Monroe County, 72 Miss. 3o6.
26 Fears v. Nacogdoches County, 71 Texas, 337, 9 S.
V. Rep. 265; Frio County v. Earnest, - Texas -, 16 S. W. Rep. 1036. Subsequent to these decisions, compensation was
provided by the legislature. See Laws of Texas, 1893, P. 155.
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not prevent his recovering for making a post-mortem examination
of the body of one of the paupers who came to his death under
circumstances that made a post-mortem proper, for the reason that
a general engagement to treat the poor of the county asylum would
not contemplate special public services in connection with an
inquest.27
In his employment of medical or surgical skill at the inquest, the
cdroner is not confined in his selection to physicians residing
If in his judgment the ends of justice
within the county.
will be, better subserved by the employment of non-resident skill, it
is his dut, under the law, to employ such skill, for the law requires
of him to use the best means at his command for the discovery of
the truth. A reasonable compensation to the non-resident physician
so employed will be a valid claim against the county. " It is also"
held in the cases last cited that the fact that the inquest was instigated and the expert employed through the exercise of outside
and improper motives, would not, iii the absence of notice to the
claimant, be a defense to a suit for reasonable compensation.
Sometimes the statute providet that the duties usually performed
by a coroner in connection with inquests may, under specified conditions, devolve upon some other official, as, for example, upon a
justice of the peace. Under such circumstances, the substituted
official would have the authority of the coroner in the matter of
binding the county for the expense of medical services in preparation for, and in connection with, the inquest.2
It will be apparent from a reading of the cases upon the subject
that have been cited, that the bill of a physician for a post-mortem
examination, made under the order of a coroner, and for his
services in connection with the inquest, is usually a charge against
the county in which the case arises. Ordinarily it cannot properly
be allowed as a claim against the estate of the deceased.
Such examinations and such services are made and rendered, as a
rule, for the purpose of aiding the authorities in the enforcement
of the criminal laws, and are for the benefit of the general public;
those interested in the estate are concerned only as members of the
community at large. The charges for such services should be paid
by the public, and if no provision for payment has been made by law,
they cannot for that reason be collected out of the estate of deceased.
for the estate cannot properly be made to pay for services that are
t

2 .ang v. Board of Commissioners of Perry County, 121 Ind. 133, 22 N. E. Rep. 667.
2 Jameson v. Board of Commissioners of Bartholomew County, 64 Ind. 524: Board of
Commissioners of Bartholomew County v. Jameson. 86 Ind. 154.
-'aBoard of Commissioners of Dubois County 2. Wertz. x12 Ind. 263.

874.

See, also, Stevens v. Harrison County Commissioners. 46 Intl. S41.

3

. E. Rep.
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essentially public. And if a statute has fixed the fees to be charged
for such services, the party rendering them will be confined to the
statutory fees, unless the law provides for extra compensation under
exceptional circumstances. Nor can the expenses of an autopsy
made for scientific purposes be properly preferred as a claim against
the estate of the deceased, for the object in view is benefit to the
medical profession and not to those interested in the estate.
Undoubtedly the personal representative of an estate could bind it
for such services, if they were rendere4l upon his request in his
representative capacity.30 It should be noted that the foregoing doctrine has in one or two states been somewhat changed by statute.
The code of Alabama, for example, provides that "any surgeon or
physician, who, being duly subpoenaed, attends a coroner's inquest,
examines the body, and gives a professional opinion thereon, is
entitled to receive five dollars, with one dollar additional for each
mile he may be compelled to travel attending such inquest, to be
collected out of the estate of the deceased, if solvent, and if insolvent,
to be paid out of the county treasury.""' The Nebraska statute upon
the subject is somewhat unusual. It provides for "afee to the physician of ten dollars for making a post-mortem examination under the
direction of the coroner, "to be paid out of any goods, chattels, lands
and tenements of the slayer*(in case of murder or manslaughter), if
he hath any, otherwise by the county, with mileage or distance
actually traveled to and from the place of viewing the dead body. 3 2
In Oregon the coroner is required "to subpoena and examine as witnesses every person, etc., etc., * * * and also a,surgeon or physician who must in the presence of the jury inspect the body and give
a professional opinion as to the cause of the death or wounding."3 3
It will be noticed that the physician is obliged to attend, inspect the
body and give his professional opinion, and that no direct provision
for compensation is made. However, he may present his claim for
services to the coroner, and it is the duty of that official to return it
as a part of the expenses of the inquest, when the county court of
the county, sitting for the transaction of county business, may pass
upon the claim. Its act in such a matter is judicial, and its award
must be regarded as just compensation, although its decision may
be reviewed. It has been held that the claimant musf acquiesce in
"°In support of above statements, see Smith v. McLaughlin, 77 I1. 596; Greene v.
Monroe Count, 72 Miss. 306.
31 Code of Alabama (1896), Vol. 2, 4936.
2Comp. Statutes of Nebraska, Ch. 28, 3483, Sec. 7.
3Bellinger and Cotton's Ann. Codes & Statutes of Oregon, Vol. s, § x685.
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this mode of procedure, and that he cannot bring an action against
the county upon such a claim."
When the medical expert is called upon to serve in a contested
case, he is not as a rule brought in by the subpoena, as is the ordinary
witness, but he comes as the result of an agreement with an interested party in regard to his compensation. It has become a very
general practice for a party who is advised by his attorney that the
services of a physician in connection with the preparation and trial
of the case are necessary, to contract for such services, which usually
include preliminary investigations and experiments, if necessary,
attendance at court during the trial, and the giving of expert tesfi-,
mony upon the trial. While such a contract, so far as it provides
for preliminary investigations and continuous attendance at the trial,
will be upheld, if free from improper and champertous qualities,3 5
there is certainly some doubt as to.its validity when made to secure
simply the testimony of the expert where the expert is obliged like
the ordinary witness to appear and testify for the compensation fixed
by law, if regularly summoned. In Collins v. Godefroy,38 LoRD TXNTERDnN, C. J., said: "If it be a duty imposed by law upon a party
regularly subpoenaed, to attend from time to time to give his evidence, then a promise to give him any remuneration for loss of time
incurred in such attendance is a promise without consideration. We
think that such a duty is imposed by law ; and on consideration of the
statute of Elizabeth, and of the cases which have been decided on the
subject, we are all of opinion that a party cannot maintain an action
' 37
for compensation for loss of time in attending a trial as a witness.
But whether or not an agreement of this kind is valid, it is one that
is constantly made and one that frequently turns the expert into an
advocate for the party calling him. Nothing has contributed so
much to the discrediting of expert testimony as the practice of putting the services of the expert upon a professional basis in regard to
compensation and perfnitting the matter to be one of contract
between the expert and the litigant. In theory the expert acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity, as an aid to court and jury, and, it goes without saying that, so acting, he should be free to give his candid opinion,
uninfluenced by contract relations with either party. But in practice,
in many cases, he is upon the plane of the paid advocate, feeling it to
be his duty to the party who has employed him to sustain, if possible,
3 Pruden v. Grant County, 72 Ore. 309, 7 Pac. Rep. 308.
' See Barus r. Phaneuf, x66 Mass. 123, 44 N. E. Rep. 141; Brown '. Travelers Life
and Accident Ins. Co., 26 App. Div. Rep. (N. Y.), 544; Lewis z,.
Blye, 7"9Ill.
App. 256.
11 Collins -,.
Godefroy, x B. & Ad. 95o.
2? See, also, Walker v'. Cook, 33 I1. App. 561; Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463; Smith v.
McLaughlin, 77 Ill.s96.
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a predetermined theory of prosecution or defense. It is needless to
add that this is subversive of justice and demoralizing in the
extreme. And yet there is much to be said in favor of some plan
that shall give to the expert a larger compensation than that provided
by law for the ordinary witness. If the medical expert, for example,
be a recognized authority in some department of medical science
that must contribute frequently to the solving of questions in court.
he ought not in justice to be obliged to respond to the frequent
demands upon his time in connection with litigation, without something like adequate returns. And compensation ought to be provided in such a way and under such safeguards that no one would
think of discrediting his 'testimony as having been influenced by a
consideration or of regarding him as having acted in any other
capacity than that of amicns curiae. Legislative attempts at regula-.
tion have been made, but as a rule they furnish only a partial solution
of the difficulty. The principal provisions upon the subject will be
found in the note.3s A reading of them will show that the purpose
2s Iowa. "Witnesses called to testify only to an opinion founded on special study or
experience in any branch of science, or to make scientific or professional examinations and
state the result thereof, shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court
with reference to the value of the time employed and the degree of learning or skill
required, but such additional compensation shall not exceed four dollars per day while so
employed." Iowa Code (1897), § 466t. It has been held that, under this statute, in order
that a physician who has testified may be entitled to extra compensation, it must affirmatively appear that he has been called as an expert to testify within the field specified in
the statute. It is not sufficient to show simply that the physician was called as a witness.
Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa. 646.
Louisiana. "Witnesses called to testify in court only to an opinion founded on special
study or experience in any branch of science, or to make scientific or professional examinations and to state the results thereof, shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed
by the court with reference to the time employed and the degree of learning or skill
required." Act. i, 1884, p. 25, Wolff's Rev. Laws (1897), p. 930.
It is also provided in Louisiana, by the Code of Practice, that "Experts
shall be entitled to receive such compensation for their services as the court may determine.
according to the nature of the case, and such compensation shall be included in taxed costs."
Garland's Rev. Code of Practice of La. (1894), § 462.
Minnesota. "The judge of any court of record in this state .before whom any witness
is summoned, or sworn and examined, as an expert in any profession or calling, may. in
his discretion, allow such fees or compensation as, in his judgment, may he just and
reasonable." Minn. Stat. (1894), § 5547.
This statute has been construed to apply to witnesses "called to testify to an opinion
founded on special study or experience in any profession or calling, or to make scientific
or professional examination in some matter connected with the issues involved in the case.
and then state the results,-and not to cases where a witness, skilled in some profession
or calling, is called upon to testify as to facts within his personal knowledge, although lie
may have acquired his knowledge of the facts while in the ordinary practice of his profession.
and although his professional skill may have enabled him to ohserve such fact- more intelligently and narrate them more correctly." LeMere ' MelTale. 30 Min". 410. 15 N. W. Rep.
6 2. It is held in State v, Teipner, 36 Minn. 535. that this provision has "reference to an
allowance to be made after the witness has been summoned and dismissed without being
sworn and examined, or after he has been sworn and examined. and not before."
Ohio. -When in the examination or trial of any person accnsed of the commi-ion of
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has generally been to leave the matter of compensation to the discretion of the court, the maximum amount to be allowed in some
instances being fixed by the statute. But excepting in the statute
of one state, that of Michigan, no attempt has been made to prohibit
a private agreement with the expert as to compensation. The Michigan statute, which is given in the note,"5 is the latest legislative
crime, or upon inquiry before the grand jury, it shall appear to the prosecuting attorney
* * * * to be necessary to the due administration of justice to procure examination
by chemical or other experts, or the testimony of expert witnesses, the county commissioners may, upon the certificate of the prosecuting attorney, or his assistant, that such
services were, or will be, necessary to the due administration of justice, allow and pay
such expert such compensation for his services as the court approves and as the commisi Bates' Anno. Stat., Ed. 4 (1903), p. 640, § 1302-1.
sioners may deem just and proper."
[95 V. 282, April 28, X902.]
Rhode Island. "Any justice of either division of the Supreme Court sittisig in chambers, may, in any case, civil or criminal, on motion of any party therein, at any time
before the trial thereof, appoint one or more disinterested skilled persons, whether they
be residents or non-residents, to serve as expert witnesses therein, provided that the
reasonable fees of such experts, according to the character of the service to be performed,
to be fixed by such justice, shall be, by the party moving for such appointment, paid to the
clerk of such division at such time at such justice shall prescribe, and the amount so paid
shall form part of the costs in such case."
"In criminal cases, in the discretion of the court, on request of the defendant, expert
Gen. Laws
witnesses may be furnished for such defendant at expense of the state."
of R. I. (1896), p. 835, § e5South Carolina. "Physicians and surgeons bound over, or summoned by the state to
testify as experts in any case in the courts of general sessions * * * * shall receive
the sum of five dollars in addition to the fees
as compensation therefor * * * *
provided by law to be paid to other witnesses in such cases, provided that the circuit judge
before whom the case is tried shall certify that the testimony of such expert is material."
S. C. Stat. at Large (1905), No. 457Vermont. "In state cases extra compensation may be allowed to expert witnesses only
in case they have been pleviously selected, and their production ordered, by a judge of
the Supreme Court, to prevent a failure of justice. And such compensation shall he. fixed
by the court before whom the trial is had." Vt. Stat. (z894), p. 956, § 5395.
And it is provided further that "Any person in the employ of the state on a stated
salary, who shall be summoned at the expense of the state to testify as an expert in any
Pub. Acts (1898).
cause, civil or criminal, shall receive only the ordinary witness fees."
NO. 49, § s.
24See. i. "No expert witness shall be paid, or receive as compensatibn, in any given
case, for his services as such a sum in excess of the ordinary witness fees provided by law,
unless the court before whom such witness is to appear, or has appeared, awards a larger
sum, and any such witness who shall directly or indirectly receive a larger amount than such
award, and any person who shall pay such witness a larger sum than such award, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in.the county jail not to exceed one year, or
both, in the discretion of the court, and may further be punished for contempt."
Sec. 2. "No more than three experts shall be allowed to testify on either side as to tie
same issue in any given case, except in criminal prosecutions for homicide: Provided, the
court trying such case may, in its discretion, permit an additional number of witnesses to
testify as experts."
Sec. 3. "In criminal cases for homicide, where the issues involve expert knowledge or
opinion, the court shall appoint one or more suitable disinterested persons, not exceeding
three, to investigate such issues and testify at the trial, and the compensation of such
person or persons shall be fixed by the court and paid by the county where indictment was
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expression upon the subject to which the attention of the writer has
been called, and it is especially significant in that it makes it a misdemeanor for the expert to receive, or for any person to pay the
expert, a larger amount than has been awarded by the court, a substantial penalty being provided. This statute is further significant in
that it provides for a limit upon the number of experts that may be
called and for the appointment by the court in honicide cases of one
or more experts, not exceeding three, to investigate and testify at the
trial, their compensation to be fixed by the court and paid by the
county. The statute must certainly commend itself to the public and
to jurists as containing corrective provisions that may well be followed in other jurisdictions. So far as the writer knows, it has
not as yet received judicial construction. It is to be hoped that the
rather ambiguous provision of the fourth section will not serve to
defeat or narrow its purpose.
H. B. HUTCHINS.
U'NIVERSITY OF MICHIGN.

found, and "the fact that such witness or witnesscs have been so appointed shall be made
known to the jury. This provision shall not preclude either the prosecution or defense
from using other expert witnesses at the trial."
Sec. 4. "This act shall not be applicable to witnesses testifying to the established
facts or deductions of science, nor to any other specific facts, but only to -witnesses testify.
ing to matters of opinion." Public Acts of Michigan (19o5). p. 242.
This legislation originated in the 'Michigan State Bar Association. See Report of Committee on Meilical Expert Testimony in Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of
Michigan State Par Aesociation. 1895, P. 72-77, in which the statute i' explained, the
principal cases upon the suhject cited, and the bibliography of the subject given.

